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Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?

"SOCIETY HAS a center." Yet just as certain societies have stronger centers than others, the materials of which centers are forged vary greatly between societies.[1] The Middle East has had a long history of attempts to construct the institutional framework of such centers, even though efforts to marshall these "free floating"[2] resources were, more often than not, ephemeral. Here, the Ottoman Empire emerges as an outstanding exception. There was, in the Ottoman Empire, a lasting center supported by a sophisticated network of institutions.

The methods the Ottomans used were ingenious and varied. By coopting in the ruling elite individuals largely recruited at an early age from religious minorities, by socializing them into the official class, by tightly controlling, though not necessarily centralizing, the system of taxation and land administration, and by dominating the religious establishment, the center acquired strong leverage in the spheres of justice and education, and in the dissemination of the symbols of legitimacy.[3] These imperial achievements emerge even more clearly in relation to the situation in neighboring Iran. Iranian rulers were often merely "grand manipulators," gingerly juggling the many social forces over which they were unable to establish control. But Ottoman success in these matters cannot fully be evaluated by a simple contrast with the institutions of its neighbors.[4] To establish a fuller perspective another comparison is in order, one that places the Ottoman Empire side by side with the emerging, Western centralized state, and its successor, the modern nation-state.

Both "Leviathan," the form of government which emerged in the West in the middle of the seventeenth century, and the later nation-state had a role to play in the development of Ottoman institutions. At first they were seen as rivals who were beginning to excel in precisely those areas where the Ottomans had traditionally prided themselves for achievement. Eventually, however, during the process of modernization, the Ottomans looked to these new forms of the state as models for reform in their own government.

Leviathan and the nation-state are also important for Turkish history

because they present structural contrasts to Ottoman institutions. The forces that shaped the state in the West seem to vary significantly from those that shaped the Ottoman state before modernization set in. Because of its feudal antecedents, the process of centralization that created the modern state included a series of confrontations leading to compromises with what may be called the forces of the periphery: the feudal nobility, the cities, the burghers, and later, industrial labor. The consequence of these compromises was that Leviathan and the nation-state were relatively well articulated structures. Each time a compromise—or even a one-sided victory—was obtained, some integration of the peripheral force into the center was achieved. Thus the feudal estates, or the "privilégiés," or the workers became integrated into the polity while, at the same time, obtaining some recognition of their autonomous status. These successive confrontations and co-optations had important consequences. The confrontations had been varied: conflicts between state and church, between nation builders and localists, between owners and non-owners of the means of production. These cross-cutting cleavages introduced a variety of political identifications which provided for much of the flexibility of modern Western European politics.[5] Also, the center existed within a system of linkages with peripheral elements: medieval estates found a place in parliaments; the lower classes were accorded the franchise.

In the Ottoman Empire before the nineteenth century these characteristics of multiple confrontation and integration seem to be missing. Rather, the *major* confrontation was unidimensional, always a clash between the center and the periphery. In addition, the autonomy of peripheral social forces was more than anything *de facto,* an important difference from the institutional recognition accorded, for example, to estates in Western Europe, which were "separate from the Lord or Prince"[6] even when they were "dependent corporations."[7] Until recently, the confrontation between center and periphery was the most important social cleavage underlying Turkish politics and one that seemed to have survived more than a century of modernization. This paper takes up the ways in which this cleavage was perpetuated during modernization.

The Traditional System

There were many reasons why the opposition of center and periphery became the outstanding issue of Ottoman political and economic life. One of these was the incompatibility of urban dwellers with the always large contingent of nomads in Anatolia, the core of the Empire. The state's difficulty in dealing with nomads on the periphery was endemic. But more than this, the clash between nomads and urban dwellers generated the Ottoman cultivated man's stereotype that civilization was a contest between urbanization and nomadism, and that all things nomadic were

only deserving of contempt. A residue of this basic cleavage between nomad and sedentary population can still be seen today in Eastern Turkey where the statistical data, social structure, and basic issues of thirteen provinces with settled agriculture contrast so sharply with those found in the four provinces with a pastoral economy and residues of nomadism.[8]

Another component of the center-periphery cleavage was the suspicion of the center towards the remaining traces of a pre-Ottoman nobility and a number of powerful families in the provinces whose star had risen with that of the Ottomans. The provinces were also hotbeds of intractable religious heterodoxy. Turbulent sects, syncretic cults, self-appointed messiahs presented a long-lasting and well-remembered threat. When the Ottoman provinces occasionally became havens for pretenders to the throne, the periphery gained the added onus of having served as a launching pad for rebellions.

All of this occurred against a background of localism tolerated by the center, for Ottoman social engineering stopped before insurmountable organizational tasks. As the Empire expanded, the Ottomans dealt with the new social institutions they encountered by giving the seal of legitimacy to local usages and by enforcing a system of decentralized accommodation toward ethnic, religious, and regional particularisms. No attempt was made for a more complete integration when loose ties proved workable. One may count among these semi-autonomous groups the non-Moslem communities controlled by their own religious leaders. Thus, in the more general, ecological sense, the center and the periphery were two very loosely related worlds. This aspect of Ottoman society, together with social fragmentation, set one of the primary problems of the Ottoman establishment: the confrontation between the Sultan and his officials on the one hand, and the highly segmented structure of Ottoman Anatolia on the other. Anatolia is particularly important for modern studies since it is the territorial component of modern Turkey.

Those who opposed segmentation, the officials, were set apart from the periphery not only by being, so to speak, on the other side of the fence, but by virtue of certain distinctive status characteristics, as well as by certain symbolic differences. For a long time, one of the distinguishing marks for a number of high—and low—officials was that many were recruited from non-Moslem groups.[9] This practice was designed to establish an ideal pattern, that of the bureaucrat becoming the Sultan's slave (*kul* in Turkish). In this ideal scheme, the official figured as a person with no ascriptive ties and as totally devoted to implementing the goals of the dynasty. The establishment was, therefore, open to accusations of having excluded free-born Moslems from these posts; obviously, this impediment to access rankled. Friction also existed between the *kul* and the members of the religious establishment who, barring certain exceptions, were closer

to the daily life of the lower classes. The religious institution was thus on the border line between the center and the periphery. During modernization, and because of the secularizing policies of the center, it was increasingly identified with the periphery.[10]

The bases of the distinction between the official elite and the periphery were to be found in economic variables as well. Officials were not subject to taxation; when the Empire was flourishing their income compared favorably with that of the richest merchants. This was partly attributable to the administrator's costs for employing certain personnel and other office expenses, but it was also an aspect of Ottoman legitimacy: the wielders of political power, not the merchants, were the first citizens of the realm. The tight control established by the state over the economy was a further example of the primacy of politics in the Ottoman Empire.[11] Officials wielded extensive power in their administrative capacity. Conversely, because of their *kul* status, they were subject to special, administrative law and lacked the "civil rights" of the Moslem population.[12] In a wider perspective, the entire life-style of the patrimonial official and free-born Moslem contrasted.

The confrontation between the center and the periphery was not, however, due to a hereditary transmission of official status. On the contrary, by and large, advancement was by merit; this was a feature of the way official careers were made when the Empire was most vigorous. Some families with a history of service to the state held privileged positions, but this second pool for the recruiting of officials provided its members only with indirect privileges of access to officialdom. It was only after the Empire reached its nadir that the practice of official patronage or the influence exerted by court circles seem to have become more important.

One aspect highlighting the difference between all types of officials and the masses, both rural and urban, was the operation of the bureaucratic core of the state. Its arrogation of the major control of the economy and society, its control of the commerce of foodstuffs, the limitations it placed on land ownership, and the strictness with which it tried to enforce social stratification through sumptuary regulations were all designed to maintain the state's authority over the nodal points of society and to build a corresponding image of paramountcy.[13] Property relations were included in this system. The Sultan had full property rights on arable land outside the cities. He could alienate land when he chose, but, in fact, relatively little land was given out in freehold. *Latifundia* existed, but most of them were usurped and could, when necessary, be confiscated by the state. Conversely, peasant land could only be expropriated by fraud, by circumventing the original understanding under which the land had been granted. The state was always alert to the suggestion that such fraud had been perpetrated, but action was restricted by three major considerations. In some regions land had been granted as freehold, while in others, per-

petuation of property rights was based on the feudal system in operation at the time of the Ottoman conquest. Finally, in many regions the state did not have the power—or the will—to oppose the seizure of land by notables. A number of changes away from the original system of military "fiefs" worked in the long run to favor notables in this respect. When the state could re-assert itself, as it did during the nineteenth century, it tried to protect individual peasant holdings by adopting statutes to hamper the consolidation of land.[14]

The state's claim to political and economic control was bolstered by its title to cultural preeminence. Relative to the heterogeneity of the periphery, the ruling class was singularly compact; this was, above all, a cultural phenomenon. Two elements, one positive, one negative, may be isolated here. On the one hand, the entire mechanism of the state was permeated by the myth of the majesty of the Sultan; on the other hand, there were restrictions placed on the common mortal's access to the symbols of official culture. For much of the population, nomad or settled, rural or urban, this cultural separation was the most striking feature of its existence on the periphery. Rulers and officials were heavily influenced in the cities by the culture of earlier, successful, urban cultures such as the Iranian. Iranian bureaucratic culture in particular was diffused into Ottoman institutions. For example, the rulers adopted languages—Persian and Arabic —that were foreign to the lower classes and worked these into the official culture.[15] The periphery only benefited from one of the educational institutions that trained members of the establishment—the religious training institutions. Not surprisingly, the periphery developed its own extremely varied counter-culture, but it was well aware of its secondary cultural status, an awareness best illustrated by its clumsy imitation of the styles of elite culture. This was particularly true of the lower classes, both rural and urban, for in this matter the urban masses could also be counted as part of the periphery. Even at the height of the Ottoman power, when the image of the Sultan as a provident father had a tangible economic reality, the court, officials, and politics were grim things from which the populace kept apart. Today, *siyaset* means *politics* in Turkish, and *siyaseten katl* means *condemnation to death for reasons of state,* but in earlier official parlance *siyaset* (politics) was also a synonym for a death sentence imposed for reasons of state. This grim connotation is the one which *siyaset* still retained for peasants in a study carried out in 1968 and 1969.[16]

These aspects of the style of state domination and of official status and culture together made up a cluster, an institutional code. In this code the set of principles which kept officials alert to the erosion by the periphery of the achievements of the center occupied an important place. On the other hand, the forces of the periphery, such as locally powerful families, saw the central officials as persons with whom they had many points of contact, and also as rivals who tried to get the greatest possible share of the

agricultural surplus and other values for the center—which meant less for themselves. Because of the fragmentation of the periphery, of the disparate elements that entered into it, it was to begin to develop its own code much later. In earlier times this code simply consisted of an awareness of the burdens imposed by the center.

The world-view of those opposing the state's incursions into the economic and social life of the periphery made up an attitude if not a code that spelled localism, particularism and heterodoxy. What have been called "primordial groups"[17] played an important role in the periphery, and identification with such a group was one of a variety of forms that this peripheral stance could take. In fact, however, the many different forms of the peripheral stance were similar only in sharing a negative view of officialdom. When local notables were used in an official capacity, and the state was often obliged to use them, this attitude softened, but the lack of any real legitimization of anyone outside officialdom kept alive the potential for tension.

During the heyday of the Empire, this potential for violent confrontation between the center and the periphery materialized only sporadically, both because of the normal fragmentation of social forces and because of the linkages with the periphery which counterbalanced this possibility. Among these one may count the regular system of recruitment of free-born Moslems into some parts of officialdom, the judicial system penetrating to the subprovincial level, the tradition of public works and charitable foundations, and the wide net of the religious institution—the real hinge between center and periphery.[18] The system of military "fiefs" was a particularly efficient integrative mechanism; the normal fief holder at the time of the rise of the Empire being a cultivator with close ties to the peasant.[19]

It was only with the decline of the Empire that Ottoman officials became plunderers of their own society, and that the relation between officials and the periphery—especially the peasant heavily burdened with taxes—increasingly showed the mark of "Oriental despotism," a type of exploitation basically different from the grimness of Sultanic rule in earlier times and comparable to the earlier system only in the way it perpetrated the cleavage between the governing elite and those excluded from it. Likewise, the local population increasingly relied on local notables who emerged at this juncture to articulate local interests. Despite the growth of their influence and authority, these notables still had no autonomous status comparable to that of the European feudal nobility. While their legitimacy was acquired in their role as agents for the center, increased autonomy could only be obtained by defiance of state power or by outright rebellion.[20] Thus, only those notables rich in land and powerful enough to stand up to the state could gain greater autonomy. There are some signs that where this occurred, the local notables were no less interested in squeez-

ing the peasants than was the state, but at least they saw it was in their interest to provide those minimum services that kept the system going.

One urban form of a new type of estrangement of the Ottoman periphery from the center appeared in Istanbul in 1730 in the form of the so-called Patrona revolt. Through their guilds, the artisans of Istanbul had been asked to contribute heavily to a military campaign that fizzled out because of the timidity and incompetence of the Palace. By then the lower classes in Istanbul had for some time witnessed the Westernization of Ottoman statesmen and the Palace through various attempts to copy the pomp of Versailles and the libertinism of eighteenth century France. When called to arms to prevent the subversion of traditional ways, they responded.[21]

There had been many rebellions in Istanbul before, but this was the first to show a syndrome that was thereafter often repeated: an effort to Westernize military and administrative organization propounded by a section of the official elite, accompanied by some aping of Western manners, and used by another interest group to mobilize the masses against Westernization. Turkish modernists have concentrated exclusively upon the background of political intrigues by statesmen which, indeed, was an aspect of this and similar revolts. However, for a complete picture we should also dwell on the cultural alienation of the masses from the rulers, of the periphery from the center. During later phases of modernization, this alienation was to be compounded.

Ottoman Modernization During the Nineteenth Century

Three outstanding problems stood out as demanding solution in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. All were related to the Ottoman reformers' attempt to build a state modeled after the nation-state, and all brought into play the relations of the center with the periphery. The first was the integration of non-Moslem groups within the nation-state, and the second consisted of accomplishing the same for the Moslem elements of the periphery—to bring some order into the mosaic structure of the Empire. Finally, these "discrete elements" in the "national territory" had to be brought "into meaningful participation in the political system."[22] This last development was not initiated until the middle of the twentieth century; however, through the first tangible co-optation of notables into politics, a beginning of integration began to be seen after 1908.

The national integration of the non-Moslem components of the Ottoman Empire was more than anything achieved by default, by losses of territory during the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. With its policy of exchanges of population, the Turkish Republic made the situation even simpler. In the years following the exchange, the Republic might have continued to take a suspicious view of non-Moslem minorities,

but only in rare cases did minority problems constitute the substance of an outstanding political issue.

Although it is usually overlooked, the national integration of Moslem components was just as much of a problem as that of the non-Moslem groups. The architects of the Turkish reform policy, the *Tanzimat* (1839-1876), had already set a foundation stone here through their fiscal and administrative reforms.[23] By the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state was an increasing presence in the daily life of the periphery. Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) tried to continue the integration of the periphery by compelling the remaining nomads to settle down. At the same time, the Sultan attempted to bring to the Moslem Ottoman periphery a sense of its unity with the center. As is well underlined by Sir William Ramsay, Abdulhamid's policy of Pan Islamism was not so much a dream of uniting all Moslems as an effort to establish some form of proto-nationalism, to unite his people around an Islamic-Imperial idea. As Ramsay notes:

> Until very recent times, the motley population of Asia Minor appears to have been perfectly content with tribal and racial designations. The Turkmen or Avshahr was satisfied to be Turkmen or Avshahr, and did not think so far as I know, of a national or imperial unity to which he belonged; and therefore there was no general name by which the Unity of the Empire could be expressed.
>
> Whether Abd ul-Hamid attached any importance to the adoption of one name or general designation for the Moslem subjects of the Empire, I am not aware. Perhaps it was outside the sphere of his interest . . . but at least it is inevitable that a process such as he was attempting to carry out should find a name to give expression to it, and the wide adoption of an imperial name in Anatolia is a marked feature of his reign, as I can assert from positive knowledge. The name was an old historic title, and the diffusion of it was a fact of Ottoman government long before Abd ul-Hamid, by his policy gave strength to a natural process in the Empire. . . . So far as I can learn there existed previously little, if any, tendency to real unification of feeling in the country, and therefore unification of name had little vitality. The tie to the Sultan sat very lightly on the many nomad and semi-nomad tribes in the country, while all Christians, Jews and certain heretic Moslems had no desire and were not accorded the right to call themselves by a name appropriate to imperial Turks. There did, however, exist a name which gradually established itself as an expression of unity in a Turkish-Moslem Empire. This name was the name Osmanli.[24]

But Abdulhamid's success at national unification should not be exaggerated. At the turn of the century, "Arab," "Laz," "Abaza," "Tcherkess," "Arnaut," "Kurd," and "Lezgi" were still words that referred to the social reality of the Empire.

The Young Turks (1908-1918) took over at a time when only this partial unification of the population of Asia Minor had been achieved. They tried to enforce a policy of cultural and educational unification throughout other areas of the Empire where much clearer ethnic cleavages

existed and local groups were better organized. Their ineptitude and incipient nationalism combined to undermine what support they might have gathered for their regime. Lack of integration, demands for decentralized administration, as well as provincial opposition to what were considered the secular ideas of the Young Turks are a main theme of their years in power and appear within, as well as outside, Anatolia.[25]

Thus, Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk), who limited his objectives to redeeming Anatolia for Turkey, did not begin with a clean slate. In the earliest stages of organizing the movement for national independence, following the Ottoman withdrawal from World War I, his nationalist forces in Ankara were surrounded by insurgent groups supposedly working for the government of the Sultan opposed by Mustafa Kemal. While these groups proclaimed their aims to be the elimination of a rebel against the Sultan and to work for the greater glory of Islam, they also seem to have represented the forces of the periphery reacting against what they considered to be a continuation of Young Turk rule and a policy of centralization. Between 1920 and 1923, the fear that Anatolia would be split on primordial group lines ran as a strong undercurrent among the architects of Kemalism trying to establish their own center, and it remained as a fundamental—although often latent—issue of Kemalist Policy to the end of one party rule in 1950.

The problem of politically integrating this segmented structure only partly overlaps with the problem of national integration and may thus be taken up under a separate heading.

Social Cleavages in the Nineteenth Century

The end of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of the penetration of market values into certain more developed regions of Anatolia. Thus, the local notables' earlier basis of influence was gradually transformed, as notables of all types and origin took an increasing interest in economic pursuits. In this respect, the upper tier of the provincial periphery began to acquire a uniformity—if not a unity—which it never had had before. While one facet of this uniformity was the new focus of the notables' activities, another facet involved the new ubiquity of the opposing force: the greater penetration of the state into the periphery. These developments placed the parties to the center-periphery cleavage in a new confrontation that embodied elements of the earlier clash, but also partly transformed the nature of that conflict.

With regard to the notables, this transformation centered in the new area within which patronage began to operate. Patronage and client relations had long permeated Ottoman politics, but a structural transformation after the middle of the nineteenth century changed the total picture. For instance, the determination of the nineteenth century architects of reform

to make citizens out of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and to bring the state into the periphery by imposing new obligations—taxes, military service, various registration procedures—as well as by offering new benefits —roads, the regulation of justice, land registration—placed the individuals in the periphery in closer contact with the administrative and judicial process. Before the gradual penetration into the periphery of a system of centralist administration, inaugurated in 1864, notables still served as a transmission belt of administration through locally elected councils working with provincial governors. This role, though modified with time, continued throughout the nineteenth century;[26] notables thus became more clearly the hinge between the lower classes—the peasantry—and the officials. Largely because of the hold that the state still maintained over the economy, the new economic pursuits of the notables, where these had become important, established a second link between notables and officials. In addition, while the number of positions in the Ottoman administrative system had been considerably increased after 1876,[27] middle and lower-rank officials were only paid in a desultory fashion. The notables thus established a symbiotic relation with the officials, and bribing acquired a new dimension. This was as much a necessity for the advancement of the notables' own interests as it was one for the rendering of services to their clients. Among this new stratum of notables, one may also place the provincial men of religion, a number of whom were property owners and also belonged to the class of local "influentials." However, their influence and leverage over the lower classes was also established through involvement in religion and education. Faced with increasing secularization, these men became more clearly involved with the periphery.

With the success of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, notables began to appear in the ranks of Ottoman political parties and in parliament. Where their influence can be traced, we see they stood for administrative decentralization and for a continuation of local control over culture, which, in fact, meant an attempt to keep the hold that men of religion had established over the system of values and symbols. This was especially true for the poorer clerics, the men of religion who had no other basis of status than their standing as men of religion.[28] But the view of Islam as the crucial touchstone of the Ottoman patrimony was shared by non-religious notables. To this extent, an Islamic, unifying dimension had again been added to the peripheral code; what had thus become a characteristic ideology of the periphery was not merely an idiosyncratic proposal of *Lumpenulema.* One reason for this is clear: modern educational institutions had perpetuated the pre-modern, cultural cleavage between the center and the periphery. Modernization of Turkish educational institutions had begun with those of the officials. The provinces lay on the margin of the world of elite education; the great majority of the provincials—even of influential provincials—were unable or unwilling to send their children to

modern schools. What data we have today suggest that only the brightest ones were packed off to the capital with hopes that they would be able to establish a channel of communication with official circles. In 1903 in the province of Konya—an area that had had some development—there were 1,963 students in the modern sector of secondary education, as opposed to 12,000 students in 451 *Medrese* (religious schools) providing the traditional equivalent.[29]

Entrance into the modern sector of education was much easier for children with fathers who were already part of the class of reformist officials, or even any part of the bureaucracy. In one of the key new educational complexes, the military schools, school socialization counted for more than family socialization, by its extension of education to middle school and by its recruitment of a large portion of students from less privileged families. In this military *milieu,* the critical view of the provinces as a backwater of civilization emerged sharply. The modernization of media and of cultural life in Turkey generally increased, rather than decreased, the gap between the "little" and the "great" culture. A clinging to Islam, to its cultural patrimony, was the province's response to the center's inability to integrate it into the new cultural framework. The provinces thus became centers of "reaction." Most significant, however, was the fact that the provincial world as a whole, including both upper and lower classes, was now increasingly united by an Islamic opposition to secularism. No doubt the decentralist notables found this development heartening. The lower classes in the Ottoman capital were also part of the periphery in this new sense of persons who had difficulties in joining the stream of modernization. In this newfound unity, the periphery was challenged by a new and intellectually more uncompromising type of bureaucrat.

Modernization as the Westernization of the Bureaucrat

Ottoman statesmen, although obliged to compromise with powerful notables, were never resigned to see them acquire real autonomy: this was the core of the code of the traditional bureaucrat. However, bureaucracy was also changing in Turkey during the nineteenth century. By the end of that century, the aspects of Ottoman bureaucracy that could be called "patrimonial" or "sultanic"[30] were giving way to a "rational" bureaucracy. The applicability of this Weberian formula is limited, however, in the sense that "bureaucratic" elements, such as hierarchical structure, were much more evident than "rational" claims, such as rewards based on performance.

One section of the Ottoman bureaucracy had been attuned to the requirements of modernization relatively early and had taken the leadership in reform during the nineteenth century. This reformist bureaucracy selected as the earliest nodal point of reform the modernization of the educational

institutions preparing the military and the civilian bureaucracy. Taking over the French model of the "Grandes Ecoles," which was directed to aims very similar to those of Ottoman statesmen, the nineteenth century Ottoman reformers succeeded in producing a well-trained, knowledgeable bureaucratic elite guided by a view of the "interests of the state." In a way, the earlier elite was then perpetuated. It was now formed in molds that brought out a product in many ways comparable to the earlier official.

With the penetration of the state into the provinces, a new dimension was added to the traditional concern with shoring up the center. An attempt was made to establish a direct relation between the state and the citizen, which was partly the revival, in a new form, of an ideal of Ottoman statesmanship that there should be no intermediate allegiances between the Sultan and his subjects. During the later stages of reform, the creation of credit institutions and other facilities made a reality of the idea of the state as a provident father. When notables preempted these resources, they invited the antipathy of reforming statesmen.[31]

But to this opposition of reformist officials to notables we must add still another source of opposition which began to appear toward the end of the nineteenth century. The new conflict resulted from administrative modernization during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II. More precisely, it was a product of the Sultan's policy of half-way modernization, for while the Sultan worked hard to rationalize Ottoman bureaucracy, he also relied on individuals who countered his achievement-oriented directives. It is as yet unclear how successful in reaching access to higher positions were the graduates of the School of Political Science—an institution to the modernization of which the Sultan had given his full support.[32] Nevertheless, the younger bureaucrats and the military, who began to oppose the Sultan actively at the end of the nineteenth century, did believe that the highest administrative and governmental posts were staffed by persons characterized more by their loyalty to the Sultan than by their ability. As for the military, the Sultan's modernist reforms did not fit in well with his prohibition that large military units engage in maneuvers with live ammunition near the Capital. The attitude seeking to eliminate these contradictions and looking for a "closure" of the system might be called "national" bureaucratism, as opposed to the earlier, Ottoman ideology of "reason of state."

A further point at which the new, school-trained, national bureaucrats felt at odds with the Sultan was in their impatience to establish a modern state in Turkey. They allowed much less time for the elaboration of the nation-state as compared to the Sultan's more gradual—sometimes timid—approach. The national bureaucrat's impatience partly reflected the diffusion of nationalist ideologies into the Ottoman Empire. These ideas had affected part of the Ottoman intellectual establishment and created an intransigence not to be found among earlier reformers. No doubt the new

view of science as the touchstone of truth, which had become influential in modernist circles of the capital after 1885, fitted in well with this attitude.[33] The old Ottoman motto of preservation of "religion and the state" thus emerged refurbished in the Young Turk slogan of "Union and Progress." After these new men took the Sultan out of the picture, following the Young Turk Revolution, the provincial notables seemed to them much more evil than they had been for the traditional bureaucrats, or even for early reformers. In the Young Turk parliament the notables' bills aiming at decentralization and less military control singled them out for suspicion at a time when separatist currents were beginning to be seen as a real threat.[34]

During the Turkish War of Independence (1920-1922), this center-periphery duality appears once again within the directing organ of the national resistance movement, the Grand National Assembly. Here the Kemalists were pitted against a diffuse group which was mainly the party of notables led by alienated members of the official class. This group has been known as the "Second Group." But in the Assembly they were augmented by a larger, more inchoate cluster of representatives with Islamist and decentralist tendencies whose membership cut across group lines.[35]

These men formulated a series of extremely interesting policies regarding representation, the military, religious instruction, and religious practice. They wanted to impose a five year residence requirement in an electoral district as a prerequisite to candidacy for election as a deputy; they attempted to control the military and began to attach the gendarmerie to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that the gendarmes were preying on the civilian population; they strongly supported education through religious schools; they passed a statute prohibiting the consumption of alcohol. Because we have no precise studies of the composition and uniformity of this group, we cannot say much about their cohesiveness, but the cluster certainly served as a rallying point against Kemalists.[36]

On the other hand, the more radical elements among the Kemalists protested that in the new law of municipalities "the people" were not represented on municipal councils. They also accused the notables of Bursa of having sold out to the Greek forces with whom the Kemalists were engaged in a life or death struggle. Both sides claimed to be working for "the people," but for the Second Group this expression had clear connotations of decentralization and economic and political liberalism, whereas for the Kemalist core it had undertones of plebiscitarian democracy and the state's duty to eliminate "intermediate" groups.[37]

The symbolic expression of the Kemalists' opposition to the Second Group and to provincials focused on religion. For the moment, however, Mustafa Kemal did not show his hand.

With the end of the War of Independence and the victory of the Kemalists, it became easier to assume a hold over politics. Sophisticated political

tactics, as well as intimidation, were used with persuasion. The Republican People's Party, the Party of the Kemalists, successfully established discipline among its members. When an opposition party was formed whose activities coincided with a Kurdish revolt in 1925, a Law for the Maintenance of Order was passed giving the government wide powers for two years. Although there was no link between the Party and the revolt, the new opposition did represent decentralist aspirations. It was suppressed the same year because of what were said to be its links with "religious reaction," and indeed this, more than "Kurdishness," had been the central theme of the revolt.[38]

Although the primary aim in the suppression of this Party seems to have been the elimination of political rivals, the context in which it was made should be underlined. The nightmarish fissions seen before and during the War of Independence had traumatic effects; the Kurdish rebellion brought them to the surface. A second trauma, this time connecting political parties, the provinces, and religious reaction, occurred in 1930. At that time an experiment with multi-party politics which received strong support from the many groups opposing Kemalism, resulted in a minor "Patrona" type revolt in the town of Menemen.[39] The province, the primary locus of the periphery, was once more identified with treason against the secularist aims of the Republic. It is understandable, in this light, that beginning in the early 1930's, Mustafa Kemal should have devoted his energies to linguistic problems, cultural matters, and historical myths. It is no coincidence that he personally stepped into the picture at this time to forge a new national identity for the Turks.

In 1946 after Ataturk's death, when an important opposition political party was formed for the third time, the warning that went out from the Republican People's Party was characteristic: "Do not go into the provincial towns or villages to gather support: our national unity will be undermined,"[40] meaning "provincial primordial groups will be resurrected as political parties." Regardless of whether this argument was disingenuous, the fact is that between 1923 and 1946 the periphery—in the sense of the provinces—was suspect, and because it was considered an area of potential disaffection, the political center kept it under close observation.

Given all this tension, what is remarkable is that a sizeable portion of the provincial, notable class was successfully co-opted into the ranks of the Republican People's Party. This compromise did not differ radically from what prevailed at the time of the Young Turks, or even earlier. Dependent as it was on the notables, the center had few means of realizing the perennial Ottoman dream of working through ideally supine local intermediaries for the benefit of the peasantry. In fact, the Kemalist revolution could have been achieved in a number of ways: by an organizational revolution in which the notable was actively opposed, and/or by providing real services to the lower classes, and/or by an ideology focussing on the

peripheral masses. In fact, the builders of the Turkish Republic placed the strengthening of the state first in their priorities, even though it meant the perpetuation of dependence on notables. This might have been a very wise decision, one that allowed Turkey to survive despite the economic and military weakness of the new Republic. Yet this option seems to have been derived not so much from what, in retrospect, seem rational considerations, but from the bureaucratic code: the center had to be strengthened—partly against the periphery—before everything else. It is this aspect of the bureaucratic code that was profoundly unrevolutionary, despite the populist themes which the Republic developed.

The Republican People's Party, the single party through which Republican policies were channeled, was unable to establish contact with the rural masses. The movement "toward the people," for which so much clamor had gone up in the first years of the Ankara government, was thin, and the possibilities opened up by the Republic for establishing new links between government and peasants were not fulfilled. In fact, the meager surplus of the agricultural sector financed much of the reconstruction of Turkey. The peasant still depended on the notables for credit, social assistance, and, in some regions of Turkey, protection. The symbol of the peasant as the "fundamental Turk" came up very early in the Kemalist movement, but Kemalist energies were devoted to the building of symbols of national identity, rather than to radically altering the place of the peasant in the system. This is fairly understandable in view of the limited resources of the Republic. But the problem, in fact, went deeper.

The members of the bureaucratic class under the Republic had little notion of identifying themselves with the peasantry. This is perhaps an unfair judgment, given the large literature on the village question that appeared in Turkey at the time and given the experiment of village institutes. I do not, however, recall any members of the ruling elite having constructed an operative theory of peasant mobilization, Russian or Chinese style. As for attempts by officials to identify themselves with the peasant, these are limited to a few radical teachers. Again, one has a feeling that the traditional Ottoman relation with the periphery is being perpetuated. Investments in education, which might be used as a shorthand notation to recapture the multiple layers of this attitude, show that what little capital there was came to be invested in institutions that would shape a generation of true Kemalists at the center.[41]

One consequence of apprehending the problem in these terms was the ideational cast of the Republican program: peasants were "backward" and would only be changed by transforming the laws of the land, such as the highly unrealistic village law—what Marxists would call the superstructure.

Integration from the top down by imposing regulations had been the general approach behind Ottoman social engineering. The characteristic

features of Kemalism show that this view of society was still preeminent. In the Kemalist program, a theoretical commitment to the peasant repeated an old Ottoman theme, while peasant advancement was to be achieved by integration from the top down, an idea which also had an element of *déjà vu*. Altogether, the Kemalists had a fine understanding of *regulation*, but they missed the *revolutionary-mobilizational* aspect that, in certain contemporary schemes of modernization, mobilized masses for a restructuring of society. To the extent that regulation had always been a maxim of Ottoman rule, their ideas about modernization had an unmistakably traditional component. The only current within Kemalism which took note of the organizational-mobilizational side of modernization was the publication *Kadro* (1931-1934) which had a number of Marxist activists in its ranks. Just as the Kemalists missed the mobilizational aspects of modernization, they also did not see too well the nature of the *integrative* network of modern society, or were unable to legislate it into existence.

The thinness of Kemalist ideology has to be seen in this light. Ataturk was trying to do with ideology what he had not achieved through political mobilization or through a commitment to radical changes in social structure. This was a hard burden to shift onto ideology. The Turkish countryside, already suspect as separatist, was not brought closer to the center by these policies. While showing a remarkable ability for small but sustained growth, the periphery could see that it was paying for the prosperity of the cities, that it was being given speeches as consolation, but being denied the haven of its religious culture. Thus, it is not surprising that local notables kept their hold over the peasantry, and that the state was unable to drive a wedge into the unity of the periphery. The Democrat Party, founded by some erstwhile and prominent members of the Republican People's Party in 1946, was not so much a party of notables as it was a party that speculated with a political ideology which it thought would be strongly supported by the rural masses and by their patrons. This was the old Ottoman idea of the state being solicitous of the interests of its subjects: the protective state distributing justice on the one hand, and abundance on the other. But this time it was the periphery who had preempted this stance. To show that the issues that were so central to the opposition had their roots in the alienation from the center, we have only to look at the themes that won the Democrat Party 81 per cent of the seats in Parliament in the first multiparty elections. The new party promised it would bring services to the peasants, take his daily problems as a legitimate concern of politics, debureaucratize Turkey, and liberalize religious practices. Finally, private enterprise, equally hampered by bureaucratic controls and angered by its dependence on political influence, was also promised greater freedom.

Until 1946, the Republican People's Party had been at most a "means for political action." After this date, when parties emerged, it became "a medium for public participation in politics," but this transformation was

not sufficient to entice the periphery to it.[42] On the contrary, the electoral platform of the opposition, especially as seen in Democrat Party political propaganda, in newspapers, and in the media, established the lines of a debate between "real populists" and "bureaucrats." This symbolic and cultural paraphernalia—the conspicuous patronizing of mosques and religious rituals by members of the Democrat Party and the reluctant follow-up by the Republican People's Party—laced with protests that secularism was being lost, identified the Democrat Party with the culture of the periphery. Ironically, its four official founders were just as much part of the bureaucratic "class" as other People's Party members.

The high resonance achieved by the Democrat Party's appeal to Islam as the culture of the periphery acquires greater significance in the light of a discovery by the Turkish sociologist Behice Boran in the 1940's. Boran found that as villages came into greater contact with towns, the villager began increasingly to see his village ways as inferior. The electoral campaigns of the Democrat Party intervened at just the right time to provide many transitional rural areas with the belief that they were not inferior. The Democrat Party relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values.[43]

The blows dealt to the power and the prestige of the bureaucracy between 1950-1957 endeared the Democrat Party to both the notables and the peasants. The alliance was now continued under new conditions; the laws of the Republic, the growth of the judicial apparatus, and the success of the Republic in building the infrastructure of reforms had gradually changed the master-servant relation between patron and client, except in the still undeveloped regions, such as Southeastern and Eastern Turkey. Economic power, rather than domination, increasingly set the relation between notables and villagers. Smaller men surrounding notables saw new opportunities for economic success. Deals, trade-offs, and bargains became much more pervasive than in the earlier situations, and client politics flourished on a new level. This was not the form of mobilization that the Republican People's Party would have approved, but it was undeniably a form of mobilization, a *form* that brought a greater portion of the masses into a meaningful relation with the center than had been possible under the Republican People's Party.

The Democrat rural following might not have realized that the very possibility of these bargains stemmed from the success of the Republican People's Party in building an economic infrastructure. The workers, who at the time usually voted for the Democrat Party, might not have thought that the Republican People's Party's earlier, progressive legislation had kept them from becoming a rootless proletariat, but then, gratefulness, as some members of the Republican People's Party have continued to believe, is not an element of politics. Moreover, in the early 1950's Turkey was still relatively land rich, and thus land redistribution was not a major issue. Altogether, the notable-peasant alliance, whose framework was a common

understanding that collaboration would bring greater benefits to either side than would state control, worked rather well.

In these straits, instead of seeing its future tasks in terms of organization and mobilization, the Republican People's Party stood fast for the preservation of Kemalist ideals. And, thus, the bureaucrats selected it as the one party with which they could best cooperate. There were now good reasons to claim that the Republican People's Party represented the "bureaucratic" center, whereas the Democrat Party represented the "democratic" periphery.

The Revolution of May 27, 1960 once more underlined the cleavage between the center, now identified with the preservation of a static order, and the periphery, the real "party of movement." The old polarization of center against periphery acquired a new form: the preservers of the Procrustean, early Republican order against those who wanted change. The deposed president of the Republic, Celal Bayar, has recently commented that the difference between the Turkish Constitution of 1924 and the new constitution adopted after the revolution of 1960 amounted to the constitutional legitimization of the bureaucracy and the intellectuals as one source of sovereignty in addition to the "Turkish people," who had earlier figured as the only source of sovereignty in the Kemalist ideology.[44]

All of the protests mounted by the Republican People's Party that it was the real Party of change and the real supporter of democratic procedures were thus lost. Even the latest appeal of a faction of the Party to "populism"—an attempt to get down to the grass roots—dissipated, because the issue was not so much getting down to the grass roots as providing an alternative *means of fundamental change*. The grass roots had no confidence in the progressive, democratic, and populist policies outlined in the various electoral program of the Republican People's Party, because it placed no confidence in its methods of change.

It was easy for the periphery to identify the recent (1971) intervention of the military in Turkish politics with a desire for a return to the rigidity of the old order. Regardless of the intentions behind the move or the popular support for the reestablishment of law and order, the elements of the periphery still believe that their down-to-earth, direct, personal, observable method of mobilization and integration, with its short-run gratifications, is more tangible and presents fewer risks than the Turkish bureaucracy's system of mobilization by planned economy. Insofar as the center's attitude toward the periphery has been marked more by patronizing advice than by identification with the plight of the lower classes, they would seem to have a point. Planning seems to relegate all control over one's fate to the limbo of bureaucratic decision: once again, *regulation* raises its ugly head. Whether this is a correct assessment of the implications of planning is irrelevant; the polarity that the perception of regulation creates is that of officials versus all others.

Once my thesis is stated this simply, I should add that the picture is, in fact, more complex. Organized labor is not completely a part of the periphery. The cross-cutting cleavages of owners against non-owners of the means of production are an aspect of Turkish politics that could change the picture. A party representing the Shi'ite minority has emerged, and rumblings concerning Kurdish attempts at separate organization have been heard for some time. There is evidence both of new cleavages and of differentiation *within* the periphery. Certain members of the bureaucracy are now quite aware of the demands of a differentiated and integrated modern system, and some of them are defecting to parties representing the periphery. But these are future aspects of Turkish politics, and center-periphery polarity is still one of its extremely important structural components.

In retrospect, two facets of the peripheral code seem to have emerged with clearer outlines during modernization: the periphery as made up of primordial groups, and the periphery as the center of a counter-official culture. Both were *bêtes noires* of the Young Turks and of the Kemalists. But the policies of the modernizers, as well as fortuitous developments, worked to highlight the second facet of peripheral identity. Since this identity emerged in almost all of provincial Turkey, it was able to submerge —if not to overcome entirely—that aspect of the peripheral code that harked back to primordial allegiances. Later, this identity as counter-bureaucracy also provided a nationwide basis of allegiance for a party operating at the national level—the Democrat Party, and also for its successors. Thus, paradoxically, one aspect of the peripheral stance—of which the center was so suspicious—produced a national unity in the sense of provincial unification around common themes; it was used by the Democrat Party in its rise to power. The paradox is that this common code of the periphery which unexpectedly was productive of a unifying national skein, would probably not have emerged if the policies of the center toward the periphery had been more conciliatory.

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